ICC wants four Taliban leaders. It has no police.

The International Criminal Court has unsealed four arrest warrants against Taliban supreme leader Haibatullah Akhundzada and three other senior figures over the alleged persecution of women and girls as a crime against humanity. The October 5, 2026 disclosure sets out the court's case against the leadership and institutions responsible for justice, schools and universities under Taliban rule. These are the first public warrants concerning the Taliban's treatment of women since its return to power in 2021. ^[1][2]

The warrants also name Chief Justice Abdul Hakim Haqqani, Education Minister Habibullah Agha and Minister of Higher Education Neda Mohammad Nadim. Pre-Trial Chamber II found reasonable grounds to believe all four ordered, induced or solicited persecution on gender grounds and on political grounds against people perceived as "allies of girls and women". These are findings supporting arrest warrants, not convictions. ^[1][2][6]

All four remain in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. The ICC has no police force, leaving arrests dependent on cooperation by states or an opportunity created by a suspect's foreign travel. ^[5][6]

The Taliban rejected the court's authority. Responding to the unsealing, chief spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said: "We are bound by the rulings of Islamic Sharia and its courts, not by intelligence entities or so-called courts." The Taliban government said it did not recognise the court or its jurisdiction. ^[3]

The policy at the centre of the case

The alleged crimes span the period from August 15, 2021, when the Taliban seized power, until at least January 20, 2025. Judges found reasonable grounds to believe the four suspects implemented a governmental policy that caused severe violations of fundamental rights, linked to murder, imprisonment, torture, rape and enforced disappearance. The chamber found that girls and women were specifically targeted because of their gender. ^[1][2]

Education is central to the allegations, but the case reaches well beyond school gates. The chamber found that decrees and edicts severely deprived girls and women of education, privacy and family life, and of freedom of movement, expression, thought, conscience and religion. Its reasoning treats these restrictions as parts of a governmental policy, rather than isolated decisions. ^[1][2]

The four offices named in the warrants explain the institutional reach of the case. Akhundzada leads the Taliban, Haqqani heads its judicial system, and Agha and Nadim run the ministries responsible for schools and higher education. Prosecutors are pursuing individual responsibility at the top of those institutions, alleging that each man ordered, induced or solicited persecution under article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute. ^[1][2][6]

Akhundzada has led the movement since 2016 and previously served as chief justice of its Sharia Courts during the Taliban's 1996-2001 rule. He has issued more than 100 decrees and edicts since 2021, curtailing the rights of women and girls. The Atlantic Council describes him as reclusive and says he rarely leaves his southern stronghold, which makes foreign travel a particularly uncertain route to his arrest. ^[1][4]

The restrictions reach deeply into daily life. According to UN Women figures reported by WION, Afghanistan remains the only country where girls are barred from secondary school and women from university. WION also cited UN figures saying half of Afghan women now leave their homes only once or twice a month. ^[3]

Those figures give a measure of the exclusion described in the case. A ban on study closes one route into public life. Restrictions on movement can close almost every other one. The chamber's account brings these deprivations together as alleged persecution through the exercise of government power. ^[1][2]

Punished for being an ally

The warrants cover more than women and girls. They also concern people whose gender identity or expression does not conform to Taliban policy. The chamber ruled that the Rome Statute's definition of gender extends beyond a purely biological conception of sex and must account for socially constructed roles and hierarchies. It said gender persecution can encompass systemic and institutionalised harm, including the imposition of discriminatory social norms. ^[1][2]

That reasoning gives the case a broader legal significance. Under the chamber's interpretation, persecution can arise not only from denying a particular right, but from imposing discriminatory rules about how people must live and punishing those who do not fit them. The judges have now placed that interpretation in the public record. ^[1][2]

The political-ground allegations reach people perceived as "allies of girls and women". Judges said the targets included people opposing Taliban policies "even passively or through omission". The alleged persecution therefore extends beyond open protest to people treated as opponents because they failed to support or comply with the policies. ^[1][2]

This is a substantial part of the case, not an incidental addition. The chamber's findings describe harm both to people subjected to gender restrictions and to those punished for opposing them. On that account, declining to enforce a discriminatory rule can itself make someone a target. ^[1][2]

The proceedings began on January 23, 2025, when then chief prosecutor Karim Khan applied for warrants against Akhundzada and Haqqani. He said further applications against senior Taliban members would follow. At the time, Khan said Afghan women and girls and the LGBTQI+ community faced "an unprecedented, unconscionable and ongoing persecution by the Taliban". ^[1][5]

Judges issued the first two warrants on July 8, 2025. Their existence became public that day, but their contents remained sealed. Two more warrants followed on September 9, 2025. The October 5, 2026 decision unsealed all four, putting the allegations against the education ministers alongside those against the supreme leader and chief justice. ^[1][2][6]

Who can carry out the arrests

The ICC's founders deliberately left enforcement to states. Its 125 member states carry the responsibility for executing warrants, and Part 9 of the Rome Statute provides for cooperation with arrests and surrenders. The court can order an arrest. A state's authorities must carry it out. ^[5][6]

Judges can refer a state's failure to cooperate to the Assembly of States Parties or, when the Security Council referred the situation, to the Council. That provides a means of applying institutional pressure, not a force capable of entering Afghanistan and taking the suspects into custody. ^[5][6]

The most direct opportunity would be a wanted man entering an ICC member state whose authorities detain him and surrender him to The Hague. The other route would require cooperation inside Afghanistan, where the suspects remain under the protection of the administration they lead. The Taliban's rejection gives no indication that they intend to surrender anyone. ^[3][5][6]

No likely arrest destination can be identified from the available record. It does not establish the four men's individual travel plans or identify a state that has publicly committed to detaining them. The practical question is therefore not simply whether a country supports the court, but whether it gains access to a suspect and acts.

The Taliban administration continues to conduct diplomacy abroad. On the day the warrants were unsealed, Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi was in Moscow for the eighth Moscow Format consultation on Afghanistan. Regional governments are negotiating with the Taliban while the court seeks four of its senior figures. ^[6]

Such engagement can provide opportunities for pressure, but it is not an arrest strategy by itself. An enforceable warrant needs a specific person within reach of authorities prepared to act. Akhundzada's reported reluctance to leave his stronghold illustrates the problem: the court's strongest legal finding cannot create a journey. ^[4][5][6]

Rejection, then the custody test

The Taliban's response to publication follows its rejection of the original applications. In January 2025, the Foreign Ministry called the prosecutor's move "devoid of a fair legal basis", said it showed "double standards" and described it as politically motivated. It accused the court of ignoring crimes committed by foreign forces during the 20-year occupation. Deputy interior minister Mohammad Nabi Omari said the ICC "can't scare us". ^[5]

That objection has also formed part of criticism from outside the Taliban. Amnesty International welcomed the action against Taliban leaders while renewing its call for the prosecutor to revisit his 2021 decision to deprioritise investigations into crimes by US and allied forces in Afghanistan. Accountability for Taliban officials and scrutiny of foreign forces are not mutually exclusive demands. ^[5]

Mujahid's latest response again disputes the court's legitimacy, calling on it not to make assertions beyond its authority and jurisdiction. It offers no cooperation with the warrants. ^[3]

The next developments to watch are further applications, which the prosecutor signalled in January 2025, and concrete steps towards custody. More warrants would expand the list of wanted officials. Bringing one of them to The Hague would change the proceedings. With four men still in Afghanistan, the next decisive act must come from a state willing and able to make an arrest. ^[1][5][6]