'An absolute lie': Netanyahu sues over reports Arab allies warned him

The UAE president called Benjamin Netanyahu to warn of a major Hamas operation, and Egypt's intelligence chief flew to Israel with an alarm of his own, according to reports now confronting the Israeli prime minister three weeks before an election. Netanyahu calls the accounts "an absolute lie" and has sued Israeli outlets that published them. On the third anniversary of October 7, the dispute reaches directly into his defence of his conduct before the deadliest day in Israel's history. ^{[1] [2] [3]}

Four people in the Middle East with direct knowledge told NPR that Netanyahu was personally warned and that his security agencies received repeated alerts in the weeks and days before the attack. The accounts remain unconfirmed by Egypt or the UAE. Netanyahu denies receiving the warnings and says he did not speak to the Emirati president during the period in question. ^{[2] [3]}

The argument also runs through Israel's own security establishment. Former Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar says he warned Netanyahu "of an impending disaster, and he ignored me". Bar has said he will sue the prime minister for defamation. His allegation and Netanyahu's denial now sit alongside the accounts from Arab officials, with no state commission of inquiry established to examine the failures. ^{[2] [3]}

Israel votes on October 27. A Channel 12 poll published on October 6 put Netanyahu's coalition on 49 seats and the opposition bloc on 54, both short of the 61 needed to govern. Responsibility for October 7 is already central to the campaign. The warning reports sharpen it into a dispute over what Netanyahu knew before the attack, not simply whether he was alerted as it began. ^{[1] [4]}

A message, a call and a flight

The reported sequence begins with a message from Yahya Sinwar, Hamas's leader in Gaza, about prisoners and negotiations.

Sufian Abu Zaida, a former Palestinian Authority official, told NPR that he helped mediate secret Hamas-Israel talks for more than a year before October 7. On September 14, 2023, he said, Sinwar dictated a message for him to deliver to Israel. ^[2]

"By the end of September, we will put cards on the table," Sinwar said, according to Abu Zaida. "There will be an earthquake in the negotiations, and the Israelis should prepare to empty their prisons." Abu Zaida said he passed it to an Israeli intelligence official who acknowledged receipt, and to Mohammed Dahlan, another former Palestinian official. ^[2]

The message, as Abu Zaida describes it, tied threatened upheaval to negotiations over prisoners. That same connection appears in the account of the Emirati call.

A person close to Dahlan told NPR that UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan called Netanyahu days before October 7 and said Sinwar was planning a large assault against Israel. The person spoke anonymously because of the diplomatic sensitivity of the conversation. According to that source, the call lasted more than 40 minutes and included a warning that a "quake" would hit the region without progress on a prisoner deal. ^[2]

Haaretz placed the call about a week and a half before the attack. Its account quoted an adviser who said they sat in on the conversation: "He told Netanyahu that Israel should be ready." The warning, according to that account, concerned Sinwar preparing a major event. ^[3]

Egypt's alerts took a separate route. A senior Egyptian official, not authorised to speak publicly, told NPR that Abbas Kamel, then Egypt's intelligence chief, travelled to Israel with two other senior officials and met the heads of Mossad and Shin Bet. Kamel warned that Gaza was on the verge of an "explosion", according to the official, citing Israel's blockade, the condition of Palestinian prisoners and concerns about annexation of the West Bank. ^[2]

The Atlantic dated Kamel's visit to September 26, 2023, and reported that Egypt continued raising the alarm until two days before the attack. The Wall Street Journal, citing officials in an Arab government, reported that two Egyptian warnings had gone unheeded by early October and that Kamel then telephoned Netanyahu with a third alert. ^{[2] [3]}

Nimrod Novik, a former senior adviser to Shimon Peres and a fellow at the Israel Policy Forum, offers another account of the Egyptian messages. He told NPR that, before October 7, a person with firsthand knowledge informed him that Egypt had warned several senior Israeli officials that "Gaza is about to explode in your face". He described an "urgent and dramatic message" delivered to someone close to Netanyahu roughly 10 days before the attack. ^[2]

The reported language was forceful. It was not an operational blueprint. Most of the warnings contained no date, target or method, according to ABC News's account of the investigations. Intelligence officials cited in those investigations nevertheless said the alerts were frequent and persistent enough to warrant attention. ^[3]

What Netanyahu denies

Netanyahu's response is categorical. He calls the reports "fake news" and "an absolute lie", says he did not speak to the UAE president during the relevant period and denies receiving a warning from him. He filed a defamation lawsuit last week against Israeli outlets that published the accounts. ^{[2] [3]}

The available reporting does not include a separate response from his office to NPR's October 7 account, or a detailed account of the lawsuit's allegations beyond his denial and the defamation action. His position on the central accusation is clear, however: he says the warning did not happen. ^{[2] [3]}

The UAE has neither confirmed the call nor rejected the account. Its foreign ministry said it does not comment on media stories or speculation about conversations between government leaders. It added that, when necessary, relevant intelligence has been and continues to be communicated between the relevant entities. Egypt has not publicly confirmed the reported warnings either. ^{[2] [3]}

There is also a significant distinction between the reported channels. The New York Times, citing five former senior Israeli officials, reported that the Emirati warning never reached the leaders of Israel's security establishment. The Egyptian official who spoke to NPR, by contrast, described Kamel meeting the intelligence chiefs themselves. Those accounts concern different messages, so establishing who received each one matters as much as establishing its contents. ^{[2] [3]}

The New York Times also reported that, at an October 1, 2023 meeting, Netanyahu told his security chiefs their goal should be to maintain calm in Gaza because he believed a normalisation agreement with Saudi Arabia was imminent. That account places a diplomatic priority alongside the warnings now being described. ^[3]

The decisive evidence would be records of the calls, meetings and messages, together with what their recipients did next. Neither the Arab governments' public statements nor Netanyahu's denial supplies that chain of events.

The defence at stake

Netanyahu has described the failure to wake him as central to his account of October 7.

"There were so many warning signs, so many indications that an attack was imminent," he has said. "Had they woken me up, everything would have looked different. That is the story of October 7th." ^[3]

That defence cannot stand if two allied governments warned him days earlier. A missed alarm on the morning of the attack would still matter, but it would no longer explain his own lack of preparation. Responsibility would also turn on how he handled information already received.

This is why the reports have such political force. They challenge not just a decision, but Netanyahu's account of his place in the failure. Gayil Talshir, a political scientist at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, told NPR that they "actually turn the story on its head" by pointing back at the prime minister and challenging the narrative he has offered Israelis. ^[2]

Bar's accusation adds an internal conflict to the accounts from abroad. His statement that Netanyahu ignored a warning of disaster is disputed, not a finding. But it makes clear that the argument is not simply between Netanyahu and anonymous foreign sources. A former head of Israel's domestic security service is prepared, he says, to take his own account to court. ^[3]

Netanyahu and his government have not established a state commission of inquiry despite public demand. ^{[2] [3]} That leaves the campaign carrying a burden an election cannot discharge: testing evidence about a national catastrophe. Defamation cases can examine particular statements. A public inquiry could examine the whole chain of responsibility.

Grief enters the campaign

At a memorial ceremony this week, a father whose son was killed in the attack shouted at Netanyahu: "You didn't protect my son." Israel marked the anniversary on Wednesday with ceremonies and intense political debate. ^{[1] [2]}

The accusation from the bereaved father is different from the allegation about the phone call. It does not depend on proving a particular conversation. It expresses the failure of protection itself, the loss against which every explanation is being judged.

The electoral outcome remains open. The October 6 Channel 12 poll put Gadi Eisenkot's Yashar party first with 23 seats and Netanyahu's Likud on 21 in the 120-seat Knesset. The opposition's five-seat lead over Netanyahu's bloc does not give it a governing majority, and the poll does not establish how much the warning reports have changed voting intentions. ^[4]

Present danger is also part of the campaign. Netanyahu and his defence minister have warned that Hamas could try to attack or "challenge" Israel around the anniversary and in the run-up to the vote, NPR reported. ^[2]

Twenty days remain before the election. Netanyahu is asking voters to return him to office while denying that allies warned him before October 7. His lawsuits now put those denials before the courts. The next consequential step is an account that can be tested against records, whether from an Arab government, an Israeli security official or the legal proceedings. Until then, the question follows him from the memorial ceremony to the ballot box: what reached the prime minister before the attack, and what did he do with it?