Ukraine's protection from its next invasion may need Moscow's yes

A security guarantee that the invader has to approve is not a guarantee. It is a bargaining chip, and Moscow now holds it.

That is the problem with what Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on November 9, on the eve of US-mediated talks between Russia and Ukraine in Abu Dhabi, due on November 10 and 11. No final plan for Ukraine's postwar security had been settled, he said. Ukraine would need to feel secure after the war. But the guarantees, he said, would have to be something Russia agrees to as well in order to work. ^[1]

The Daily Inference reported on November 9 that US, Russian and Ukrainian negotiators were scheduled to meet in Abu Dhabi, with guarantees against another attack on the agenda and European envoys preparing for separate meetings. Rubio's remark adds a condition to that agenda.

I spent two decades as a foreign correspondent, and I learned to read the adjectives in a diplomat's sentence before the nouns. "Acceptable to Russia" is the adjective here. It is not a legal veto, and Rubio did not describe one. It is a negotiating condition, and a consequential one.

The best case for Rubio

He is right about some things, and they deserve to be said first. A settlement that Moscow rejects settles nothing, and the fighting goes on. Rubio also said the United States can facilitate talks and offer ideas but cannot guarantee an agreement. ^[1] That is an honest limit. Washington cannot make Vladimir Putin sign.

He was also candid about the American side. Asked whether the United States could formalize guarantees in a treaty, he said it was possible, that the issue had not been discussed in that detail, and that Senate approval would be difficult. ^[1] A secretary of state who admits the ratification problem is at least not selling a fantasy.

And Rubio drew a line between the two parties. Russia is fighting the war, he said, and Ukraine was invaded and is being attacked. ^[1] He knows which one is the aggressor.

So grant him all of it. The talks need Moscow in the room, and a deal needs Moscow's signature. None of that explains why the guarantee itself should need Moscow's approval.

What a guarantee is for

A peace treaty is a bargain between two sides. A guarantee is something else. It is a promise by third parties to Ukraine that they will act if the bargain is broken. Its whole value lies in binding the one party that might attack again, without that party's consent.

Think of a lock on a door. Its purpose is to stop the person who would like to come in. A lock designed so the would-be intruder must approve its strength protects nobody, and the intruder will approve only a lock that opens.

The record of what Moscow wants is not obscure. Ukraine has discussed guarantees modelled on NATO's Article 5, the clause that treats an attack on one member as an attack on all. Russia has opposed Ukraine joining NATO, and it has opposed the deployment of foreign troops in Ukraine after any peace deal. ^[4] Allies bound to respond and allies' soldiers on the ground are what would give a guarantee teeth, and Moscow has already said it opposes both.

So when Rubio says guarantees must be acceptable to Russia, the practical result is not a neutral filter. It hands Moscow a lever over the thing Kyiv most needs. Every clause that would make another invasion costly becomes something Russia can trade away, or trade against its demands on territory and on limits to Ukraine's army, which Ukraine has rejected. ^[4]

The question nobody has answered

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has framed the test in plain terms. If Russia attacked again, what would allies do, with what means, and when? ^[4] That is the only question a guarantee exists to answer. A pledge that cannot say what happens on the first night of an invasion is a statement of sympathy.

Kyiv does not need a lecture on what a promise of protection is worth. Russia occupies Ukrainian territory today, and the two sides remain far apart over territory, Ukraine's military and the terms of a settlement. ^[2][4] Asking the party that holds that territory to sign off on the protections against its next advance is asking a great deal of Ukraine.

Someone will answer that Rubio only meant that a deal has to be one all sides can live with. Perhaps so. If so, he should say what "acceptable" means in practice: whether Russia may reject a particular force, a particular treaty or a particular promise. Nothing in his remarks, as reported, says. He said he had not gone into detail on the treaty route, and no plan has been announced. ^[1] Until the wording is pinned down, the plain reading is the dangerous one.

Who is in the room

The second half of the problem is who gets a seat. Ukraine's delegation chief, Rustem Umerov, said European countries, including Britain, France, Germany and Italy, along with NATO and the European Commission, would be represented in Abu Dhabi. He added that Ukraine would hold separate coordination meetings with its European partners. ^[3] What that means for the trilateral negotiations themselves is unclear. ^[3]

Moscow is clear. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said the Abu Dhabi talks would be between Russia and Ukraine, mediated by the United States, without European participation. France 24 reported that he said Europeans would need to be involved in broader negotiations later. ^[3][4]

"Later" is a very convenient word. The guarantees are the hard centre of any deal, and Europeans are the ones most likely to be asked to provide them, in troops, money or promises. Their security is shaped by where the line falls and by what happens if it is crossed. A scheme in which the guarantors learn their obligations after the terms are fixed is backwards. Whoever must keep a promise ought to be present when it is written.

Put Rubio's condition beside Peskov's. Russia would approve the protections, and Europe would be briefed on them afterward. Ukraine's partners would be consulted in the corridor while the aggressor sits at the table. Kyiv's chief negotiator has said Ukraine seeks lasting peace, guaranteed security and real chances of postwar recovery. ^[3] Those goals are harder to reach when the guarantee is built to Moscow's specification.

Who the position serves

I do not think Rubio set out to serve the Kremlin. I think he is describing a mediator's problem. A mediator wants a deal and needs both sides, and the easiest sentence to say in that job is that every side must be able to accept the outcome.

But a position can serve someone without being designed to. A mediator who treats the aggressor's consent as a requirement for the victim's protection is, in effect, giving the aggressor a lead card. Moscow can now rule things out by saying they are not acceptable, and it has already said a good deal that it will not accept.

The answer is not to shut Russia out. The answer is to separate two questions that Rubio's wording merges. Russia can and must agree to end the fighting. What Ukraine's allies promise to do if the fighting resumes is for Ukraine and those allies to decide, and Russia can read the result. A guarantee Moscow cannot veto is also the only kind Moscow has reason to respect.

What to watch

In the coming days, watch three things. First, whether anyone from Washington says what "acceptable to Russia" means, and whether it covers troops and NATO-style clauses. Second, whether any European official actually sits in the trilateral sessions or stays in the side rooms. Third, whether a guarantee ever appears on paper with a named guarantor, a named trigger and a named response. Until it does, treat the optimism around Abu Dhabi as unproven.