200,000 Private Messages Sat Open to Anyone Without a Login, Firm Says
Security firm Crissy Field says database settings left sensitive records readable without a login. Its findings highlight an old security problem in apps built from text prompts: a sign-in screen does not protect the database behind it.
Apps built with Lovable exposed passport details and more than 200,000 private messages without requiring a login, according to security firm Crissy Field, raising questions about safeguards in AI-built software. [1]
The firm says its investigation identified a German lifestyle forum exposing more than 80,000 profiles alongside the messages, and a service provider exposing more than 1,000 identity-document records. Those records included passport numbers, expiry dates and nationalities. [1]
Lovable lets people create web applications from plain-language instructions, including products with databases and user accounts. The alleged exposures concern access settings in apps connected to the hosted database service Supabase, rather than evidence that someone hacked Lovable's platform. [1][5]
Crissy Field's findings have not been independently verified. The firm says it could not establish whether anyone misused the information, and the number of people affected, whether operators notified them and whether the reported access has since been closed are unknown. [1]
The technical issue is familiar even if the way these apps were built is new. A website can present a login screen while the database behind it still accepts requests for private records. Lovable's own guidance tells builders to review and test the rules governing that access before publishing. [4]
What the researchers say they found
Crissy Field says it identified and analysed 159,041 Lovable projects using Common Crawl, a large public archive of web pages, with data collected between December 2025 and September 2026. Its investigation focused on projects connected to Supabase, one backend option available to Lovable builders. [1]
Of those projects, 34,545 used Supabase. The researchers say 24,664 sent database records to a visitor's browser as soon as their websites loaded, without requiring the visitor to log in. That behaviour can be legitimate when the records are meant for public display. [1]
The researchers then made further read-only requests using the same application programming interface key, or API key, that each app supplied to the browser. They say those requests found records containing email addresses in 10,560 database tables across 7,403 websites. [1]
That is about 30% of the websites examined more closely, but Crissy Field explicitly warns against treating it as a confirmed leak rate. Email addresses may be public contact details or test data, while sensitive records containing no email address would escape that check. The sample is not representative of all Lovable apps, and the researchers retrieved only parts of the databases. [1]
The specific examples are more revealing than that broad percentage. The German forum's exposed profiles allegedly included full names, email addresses, birth dates and gender information, alongside the chat messages. A database holding both profiles and conversations presents a different privacy risk from a page publishing a business contact address. [1]
Crissy Field also says it found accessible contracts, invoices, personal photo albums, internal WhatsApp messages, and ticket and food-sale records. In another case, it reported 280,000 customer email addresses. These are separate examples, and the findings do not establish a single total of affected people. [1][2]
The firm says it withheld details that would make further access easier. It also says it worked with the German newspaper Handelsblatt, which contacted Lovable about the findings. [1]
A login screen is only the front door
Lovable's Supabase integration can turn a plain-language description into database structures and an app interface. The same system that helps a builder put a form or account page on screen can connect those features to stored records. [5]
Access to those records needs its own rules. Lovable's documentation describes row-level security, usually shortened to RLS, as the mechanism controlling which individual database records a user can read or change. For a private-message service, the practical requirement is straightforward: one user must not be able to retrieve another user's conversations. [4]
Those checks must work at the database, where requests are answered. Hiding a page or asking for a password in the visible app does not, by itself, establish that the underlying records are protected. Crissy Field's method tested that boundary by making additional requests with credentials already supplied to the browser. [1][4]
Generating an interface quickly does not remove the need to verify its permissions. An app that handles passport numbers or private conversations needs those checks before it handles the records, however its code was written.
Lovable's response and the next checks
Cybernews reported that Lovable characterised the issue as a wider configuration problem involving Supabase. A direct company response to the specific findings has not been confirmed. [2]
The distinction between platform access and app access also matters when considering Lovable's recent history. In April 2026, the company said a separate issue had made chat histories and source code in public projects accessible to other Lovable users who had a project link. Lovable said it fixed that issue and was making historically public projects private. [3]
That incident concerned visibility of development projects. Crissy Field's findings concern records stored by the resulting applications, a different access boundary with different information at stake. [1][3]
The next checks belong at that database boundary: affected operators need to test access without a login and with another user's account, following the kind of checks Lovable already recommends. For apps holding private records, a successful test means the database refuses the request. [4]
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Spotted an error? Tell the editors
- Lovable: Many Apps Expose Sensitive Data - Crissy Field GmbH Hacker News
- Lovable AI apps exposed sensitive data in open databases | Cybernews cybernews.com
- Our response to the April 2026 incident | Lovable lovable.dev
- Security best practices for Lovable apps - Lovable Documentation docs.lovable.dev
- Connect to Supabase - Lovable Documentation docs.lovable.dev




